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Here, we demonstrate that a practical Continuous Variables Quantum Key Distribution (CVQKD)
protocol relying on the Gaussian modulation of coherent states features secret key rates that cannot
be achieved with standard qubit Discrete Variables (DV) QKD protocols. Notably, we report for
the first time a practical postprocessing that allows to extract more than one bit of secret key per
channel use.
I. INTRODUCTION
QKD [1] has been the most studied quantum informa-
tion technology primitive for the past twenty years. In
a practical QKD protocol, Alice and Bob can extract an
arbitrary amount of secret key using an untrusted physi-
cal channel (also called quantum channel), provided a few
minimum assumptions such as they have access to a pub-
lic authenticated channel. Contrary to classical crypto-
graphic primitives whose security can be established only
against some restrictive classes of eavesdroppers, QKD
keys are secure in the information-theoretic sense even
against an eavesdropper with unlimited computational
resources or with undisclosed cryptanalytic knowledge.
In DVQKD protocols, the information is encoded on
discrete values, such as the phase or the polarization of
single photons, and detection is done using single pho-
ton detectors. CVQKD protocols employ continuous or
discrete modulations [2] of the quadratures of the elec-
tromagnetic field. CVQKD setups rely on a coherent
detection (homodyne or heterodyne) between the quan-
tum signal and a classical reference signal called the local
oscillator, and their implementation requires only stan-
dard telecom components. They are compatible with
Wavelength Division Multiplexing [3] which greatly eases
their deployment into telecommunication networks. In
the early history of CVQKD, this technology was ex-
pected to achieve higher secret key rates than DVQKD
protocols thanks to the possibility of encoding more than
one bit per pulse. However, the secure distance of the
most common CVQKD protocol [4], which consists in
a Gaussian modulation of coherent states in the phase
space and a homodyne detection of any of two orthog-
onal quadratures of the field at random, was limited to
25 km [5] for a long time because of the lack of efficient
error-correction procedures at low signal-to-noise ratios.
This problem was solved thanks to the multidimensional
reconciliation technique proposed in [6] together with the
design of high efficiency error correcting codes in [7] and
significantly extended the secure distance of CVQKD to
about 80 km [8]. However, multidimensional protocols
are limited to one bit per pulse.
In this paper, we exhibit high-efficiency error correct-
ing codes for the Additive White Gaussian Noise Chan-
nel (AWGNC). In the high signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs)
regime, it allows us to go beyond previous achievable se-
cret key rates [8] with CVQKD systems and extract more
than one bit of secret key per channel use; a rate impos-
sible to attain, even in principle, with qubit DVQKD
systems.
In Section II, we explain the links between the secret
key rate and error correction in CVQKD and review pre-
vious work on error correction for both DVQKD and
CVQKD. In Section III we detail the principle of Slice
Reconciliation, which is a technique that can be used
to reconcile non-binary elements, and study its practi-
cal performance in the specific case of the distribution of
Gaussian elements. Finally, we show in Section IV the
consequences of these developments on the performance
of the Gaussian protocol over short distances with a state
of the art CVQKD system and make projections about
future achievable secret key rates.
II. ERROR CORRECTION WITH
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES
A. Secret Key Rate and Error Correction
In any QKD protocol (either DV or CV), after some
quantum states are exchanged on a quantum channel,
an error correction mechanism is used to make Alice and
Bob share some common data. There are two usual cases:
either Bob corrects its errors with respect to Alice in the
direct reconciliation scenario; or Alice corrects its errors
with respect to Bob in the reverse reconciliation scenario.
In these two cases, the party performing error correction
does so using additional data revealed by the other party
through a noiseless, classical channel.
The final secret key size generated by a QKD exper-
iment therefore depends on three quantities: the raw
common data after error correction, the amount of in-
formation that was revealed during the error correction
phase, and an upper estimate of the amount of informa-
tion gained by the attacker through its interaction with
the quantum channel. The latter quantity is a result of
the security proof of the considered protocol, and is the
information that the attacker Eve has in common with
Alice in the direct reconciliation case and with Bob in the
reverse reconciliation case. In the case of CVQKD, the
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2measurement of information used is the Holevo informa-
tion and the direct (resp. reverse) quantities are denoted
by χAE (resp. χBE). The relevant quantity to take into
account for the amount of information revealed because
of error correction is the mutual (Shannon) information
between Alice and Bob, IAB . A perfect error-correction
scheme is able to retrieve all of IAB , that is, the amount
of common information after error correction substracted
of the amount of auxiliary data revealed to perform the
error correction is equal to IAB ; a practical scheme will
extract only an amount of information βIAB with β < 1.
Overall, the final amount of secret key produced by a
QKD protocol is βIAB − χAE with direct reconciliation
and βIAB − χBE with reverse reconciliation.
In the case of Gaussian modulated coherent-state
CVQKD [4], the channel parameters enabling to bound
the information obtained by Eve are the line transmission
T and the noise added by Eve on the quantum channel or
excess noise ξ. When there is no excess noise, one has for
any line transmission T , χBE < IAB : some secret key can
be produced at any distance using reverse reconciliation
with a perfect error correction scheme, or a “sufficiently
good” scheme such that βIAB − χBE > 0. Using direct
reconciliation however, χAE < IAB only when losses are
lower than 3 dB (T > 0.5), therefore a direct reconcilia-
tion scheme can be used only for short distances.
In coherent-state Gaussian CVQKD [4], the error cor-
rection schemes used also depend on the SNR of the data
to correct. For this protocol, the error-correction sce-
nario is a bit unusual since both the signal and the noise
are Gaussian, which is not a well studied scenario out-
side the field of QKD. The error correction must also
be paired with an algorithm to extract identical bits out
of highly correlated Gaussian values. The efficiency fac-
tor β is typically highly sensitive to the SNR of the sys-
tem; historical CVQKD systems used reasonably high
SNRs because of this. The coherent-state Gaussian pro-
tocol is the CVQKD protocol whose security has been
studied the most because it features higher secret key
rates than protocols that employ discrete modulations
and can be implemented with standard components con-
trarily to squeezed-state protocols. However, in contrast
to DVQKD, specific error correction techniques need to
be designed to deal with non-binary key elements. Fur-
thermore, the error correction schemes used also depend
on the SNR of the data to correct.
B. Previous work
The first reconciliation protocols were ad-hoc construc-
tions targeting DVQKD. Among these early proposals,
Cascade [9] stands out as a very simple protocol with
reasonably high efficiency. Its principal defect is that it
is extremely interactive. However, a recent implementa-
tion of Cascade [10] shows that, provided that a dedi-
cated classical communications line is available, a high
throughput is achievable.
In contrast to these protocols, most recent work in
DVQKD has focused in applying capacity-approaching
one-way error correcting codes for reconciliation. For
instance, large length (106) low-density parity-check
(LDPC) codes can be used to approach the theoretical
limits [11]. These results only hold for large lengths,
recently explicit fundamental one-way limits have been
stressed in [12] as a function of the length and the tar-
get frame error rate (FER). However, a combination of
error correcting codes with a few rounds of interactivity
allows to bypass these limitations while maintaining a
high throughput [13].
As regards CVQKD, specific error correction tech-
niques need to be designed to deal with non-binary key
elements. In [14], Slice Error Correction (SEC) was pro-
posed to extract mutual information out of any corre-
lated variables, either discrete or continuous. SEC uses
interactive error correcting codes whose efficiency is sub-
optimal as pointed in [15]. MultiLevel Coding / Multi-
Stage Decoding (MLC / MSD) are standard coded mod-
ulation techniques that were applied to CVQKD recon-
ciliation in [15] and [5]. They feature higher efficiency
than SEC for SNR between 1 and 15 but their efficiency
drops quickly for SNR below 3. In CVQKD, achieving
long distances requires to maintain a high reconciliation
efficiency for low SNRs. This is why the secure distance
was limited to 25 km [5] until the multidimensional rec-
onciliation scheme was proposed in [6]. This scheme en-
codes the information in binary variables which allows
us to deal with a Binary Input (BI) AWGNC instead of
the usual AWGNC. Since low-rate high-efficiency multi-
edge LDPC codes can be designed for this channel [7],
the achievable secure distance for CVQKD with a Gaus-
sian modulation can be considerably extended. In [6],
high efficiency with a SNR of 0.5 allowed to extend the
secure distance to about 50 km while LDPC codes specif-
ically designed for SNRs as low as 0.03 [7] were used to
demonstrate the exchange of secure keys at 80 km [8]. Fi-
nally, since achieving high efficiencies requires intensive
iterative decoding for LDPC codes, the use of Graphic
Processing Units (GPUs) [5, 16] for LDPC decoding or
the use of polar codes [16] which feature a high speed
decoder on Central Processing Units (CPUs) have been
investigated.
III. SLICE RECONCILIATION
A. Principle
Slice reconciliation was introduced in [14] as a rec-
onciliation scheme for non-binary sources using binary
error correcting codes. It works in two steps (see Fig.
1 for a schematic description of the protocol). The
first step consists in choosing a set of m slice functions
S1, ..Sm : R → {0, 1} that take the source to binary val-
ues. Together them functions can be regarded as a quan-
tizing function Q : R→ {0, 1}m that transforms the con-
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of the slice protocol for direct reconciliation. First the input source is quantized into an
m-bit source. Then each of the m sources is encoded and sent to Bob. In the figure the first slice is transmitted unencoded.
The decoder takes as side information its own source and with the m encoded sources produces an estimate of the quantized
source.
tinuous Gaussian source into an m bit source. However
by the data processing inequality I(Q(X);Y ) ≤ I(X;Y )
(or equivalently I(X;Q(Y )) ≤ I(X;Y ) for RR). That is,
there is an inherent inefficiency associated with the dis-
cretization of the source. For any fixed number of bits m
we can optimize the secret key rate by finding the func-
tion that maximizes I(Q(X);Y ) (I(X;Q(Y )) for RR).
This problem of designing a discretization function that
maximizes a mutual information criterion was described
in [17].
We consider here two different slice constructions (see
Fig. 2). Both of them divide the real line into 2m dis-
joint intervals and take the Gaussian source to the (m
bit) index of the interval. In the first slice construction
the intervals are defined by 2m−1 equally spaced points.
Finding the function that maximizes the mutual infor-
mation reduces to optimizing over a single degree of free-
dom. We report in Fig. 6 the evolution of the value of
the constant step giving the best quantization efficiency
with respect to the SNR for m = 3 to m = 5. The second
construction chooses freely the 2m intervals. In this case,
finding the optimal function is an optimization problem
with 2m−1 degrees of freedom. We can see in Fig. 5 that
this more complex construction does not improve much
the quantization efficiency obtained with the first con-
struction. This is why we used the first construction in
practice to obtain the reconciliation efficiencies reported
in Table I.
−∞ 0 ∞
Figure 2: Two examples of quantizers dividing the real line
in 23 intervals. The figure on the top shows a quantizer with
constant step, the figure on the bottom shows a quantizer
with optimized interval length.
The second step deals with sending an encoding of
Q(X) to Bob (resp. Q(Y ) to Alice in RR) such that
he can infer Q(X) (resp. Q(Y ) in RR) with high proba-
bility. This is a problem that can be readily tackled with
coding techniques. In particular, slice reconciliation uses
a multilevel coding scheme [15]. Each of the m slices is
encoded independently as the syndrome of an error cor-
recting code with rate Ri (1 ≤ i ≤ m). If the information
rates are chosen appropriately the decoder can recover
each of the slices using its own source as side informa-
tion. The rate of the encoding is upper bounded by the
capacity of the associated channel. However, this bound
can only be reached in the limit of asymptotically large
codes, in consequence the use of real, finite-length, codes
introduces a second source of inefficiency. The efficiency
β of slice reconciliation is given by:
β = H(Q(X))−m+
∑m
i=1Ri
I(X;Y ) (1)
Eq. 1 shows that β is highly dependent in the rates of
the available codes and how close they are to the chan-
nel capacities. For this reason we have chosen LDPC
codes, well known for operating close to the capacity of
symmetric binary input channels. The procedure is well
known, for each rate the space of ensembles of codes is
explored with an evolutionary algorithm [18] and for each
ensemble the asymptotic behavior of the codes belonging
to the ensemble can be evaluated with the Density Evo-
lution algorithm [19]. The evolution of the value of the
optimal rates for each slice with respect to the SNR for
an optimal discretization of the real line into regular in-
tervals is given in Fig. 7. In practice, once the number
of slices is fixed, for a given SNR we use Fig. 6 to choose
the optimal quantization step and Fig. 7 to choose the
optimal rates of the codes we need to design to decode
the successive slices.
With optimal codes, the efficiency βdisc of the dis-
4cretization scheme is
βdisc =
H(Q(X))−m+∑mi=1 Ci
I(X;Y ) (2)
where Ci is the capacity of the channel corresponding to
the i-th discretization layer. Assuming codes of efficiency
βc < 1 are used, the efficiency of the overall scheme is
β = H(Q(X))−m+
∑m
i=1 βcCi
I(X;Y )
= βdisc − (1− βc)γ (3)
with
γ =
∑m
i=1 Ci
I(X;Y )
The quantity γ therefore controls the relationship be-
tween the lack of efficiency of individual error-correcting
codes used and the efficiency loss that it causes on the
slice reconciliation scheme. Because H(Q(X)) ≤ m,
when βdisc is close to 1, γ > 1. Typical values of γ are
between 1 and 2 as shown in Fig. 3.
B. Simulation Results
An optimization on the bounds of the discretization
Q(X) shows the following basic facts. For a fixed SNR,
the higher the number of layers, the lower the discretiza-
tion loss I(X;Y ) − I(Q(X);Y ). It is always possible to
make this loss negligible by increasing the number of lay-
ers. This implies that γ increases and can become much
larger than 1 as shown in Fig. 3. As seen in Eq. 3, this
means that adding layers requires error-correcting codes
closer to the Shannon limit to minimize the loss on the
scheme caused by the inefficiency of the individual codes.
Overall, with codes having βc ≥ 95%, the 5-slice scheme
is the best on the SNR range 0.5 − 15, and is always
above 90% efficiency, as shown on Fig. 4, thanks to its
high quantization efficiency (see Fig. 5), and despite its
higher γ value at low SNR. This is much better than re-
sults of [5], where an efficiency above 90% could only be
obtained for SNRs above 7. This is mainly due to the
fact that we designed specific codes to decode each slice.
Furthermore we perform error correction with codes of
large length (220).
As a summary, we show in the first two columns of
Table I the best efficiencies obtained with slice recon-
ciliation optimizing over the number of slices and the
quantization step. In the last two columns we show the
efficiencies reported in [7] with codes for the BIAWGNC.
For SNRs below 0.5, the multidimensional methods of
[7] are more competitive than slice reconciliation. Indeed
in that case I(X,Y ) 1, and the main limitation of mul-
tidimensional methods that they can only extract 1 bit
per pulse is not a problem. Therefore the combination of
multidimensional methods and slice reconciliation with
up to 5 slices yields an efficiency above 90% for SNRs
Table I: The first two columns show the efficiencies achieved
with slice reconciliation with respect to the SNR. The last two
columns show the efficiencies achieved with multi-edge LDPC
codes with respect to the SNR, these values were reported in
[7].
AWGN BIAWGN
SNR Efficiency SNR Efficiency
0.55 93.4% 0.0075 95.9%
0.86 93.7% 0.0145 96.6%
1 94.2% 0.029 96.9%
3 94.1% 0.075 95.8%
5.12 94.4% 0.161 93.1%
14.57 95.8% 1.097 93.6%
66.10 94.8%
ranging from 0.01 to 100. For SNRs above 10, the capac-
ity of the highest layer is sufficiently close to 1 to be able
to use a simple, fast, hard decoding code such as a BCH
code to decode it. As an alternative, it is always possible
to use a code in a regime of higher SNR than its initial
threshold SNR. In this case the following efficiency can
be obtained:
βs = βs0
log(1 + s0)
log(1 + s) (4)
where s, βs denotes the target SNR and s0, βs0 the orig-
inal SNR and efficiency [28].
At the other end of the spectrum, low-rate slices are
decoded with multi-edge LDPC codes which can have an
efficiency above 95% for rates 0.1 − 0.02 [7]. For even
lower rates, multi-edge LDPC codes can be combined
with a length k repetition code without a significant ef-
ficiency loss [20]:
βs = βs0
s log(1 + s0)
s0 log(1 + s)
≈
s0≈0
1 (5)
where s = s0/k. Alternatively, the slices can be fully
revealed. Revealing a lower slice is not equivalent to re-
ducing the number of slices, since the knowledge of the
lowest slices helps the soft decoding of the upper slices.
IV. APPLICATION TO HIGH BIT RATE
CVQKD
For all our simulations, we have computed the secret
key rate against collective attacks [21, 22], which is equiv-
alent to the secret key rate against general attacks in the
limit of large block lengths. When considering finite size
effects [23, 24], the performance of reconciliation is not
affected but the modulation variance that yields the op-
timal key rate is different than in the asymptotic case;
the secret key rate is also lower in this scenario than in
the asymptotic one at any distance, partly because the
estimated value of the excess noise is increased to take
into account the statistical uncertainty of the estimator.
The secret key rate greatly varies between the direct and
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Figure 3: (Color online). Factor γ indicating the sensitivity of
slice reconciliation to the suboptimality of the error-correcting
codes used for 3, 4 and 5 slices.
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Figure 4: (Color online). Overall efficiency of slice reconcilia-
tion with error-correcting codes of efficiency βc = 95% for 3,
4 and 5 slices.
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Figure 5: (Color online). Optimal quantization efficiency with
respect to the SNR for a discretization of the real line into reg-
ular intervals (solid lines) and non regular intervals (dashed
lines). Red lines give the discretization efficiency for 3 slices
(8 intervals), green lines for 4 slices (16 intervals) and blue
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Figure 6: (Color online) Evolution of the value of the constant
step giving the best quantization efficiency with respect to
the SNR. Solid red line corresponds to 3 slices (8 intervals),
dashed green line corresponds to 4 slices (16 intervals), dotted
blue line corresponds to 5 slices (32 intervals).
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Figure 7: (Color online) Evolution of the value of the optimal
rates for each slice with respect to the SNR for an optimal
discretization of the real line into regular intervals. The low-
est plots correspond to the least significant bits which are the
noisiest bits. Solid red lines corresponds to 3 slices, dashed
green lines corresponds to 4 slices, dotted blue lines corre-
sponds to 5 slices.
reverse reconciliation scenarios. In Fig. 8 we plot both
scenarios with parameters ξ = 0.0015VA, α = 0.2, where
VA is the variance of Alice’s input signal and ideal mea-
surement devices and α is the loss coefficient of the opti-
cal fiber. For distances shorter than 2 km, DR is a better
option but the curve drops sharply and reaches zero be-
fore 15 km which corresponds to the DR limit of 3dB. RR
on the other hand has no theoretical limitation and with
the chosen parameters at 100 km still yields a secret key
rate close to 5 · 10−3 bits per symbol. These secret key
rates are the maximized rates over the variance of Alice’s
input signal. The corresponding SNR values are plotted
with the same pattern and colour as the corresponding
6secret key rate with smaller width. The remaining figures
in this section follow the same convention.
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Figure 8: (Color online). Comparison of the DR and RR
secret key rate with ideal measurement devices. The thick
lines show secret key rate, the thin lines the optimal SNR
which is equal to VA/T up to some small excess noise related
term. The secret key rate of the first four km is zoomed in
the upper right corner. Parameters: α = 0.2, ξ = 0.0015VA.
The optimization of the quantization step allows to in-
crease the secret key rate in the short distance regime.
This is particularly noticeable in the DR scenario. In
Fig. 10 we show the achievable secret key rate with ideal
measurement devices. We have chosen three scenarios for
comparison: 1) imperfect detection devices and perfect
reconciliation 2) slice reconciliation and 3) reconciliation
over a BIAWGN of the same SNR (limit case of the mul-
tidimensional channels [7]). The four curves run sepa-
rated over the whole region considered, the main reason
is that the optimal VA values correspond to high SNR
values (plotted in the same curve) which translates into
an advantage for slice reconciliation. We would like to
highlight that for very short distances, slice reconcilia-
tion allows to distill for the first time more than one
secret bit per channel use.
In the reverse reconciliation scenario the advantage of
our implementation of slice reconciliation is limited to
distances below 13 km. The reason lies in the increasing
difficulty of optimizing multilevel coding schemes for low
SNRs. Furthermore, binary encodings are optimal in the
low SNR regime. The reason is that the capacity of the
associated channel, the BIAWGN, converges to the ca-
pacity of the AWGN channel as the SNR goes to zero.
In fact, binary encodings have successfully been used for
long distance CVQKD [6]. We observe this behaviour in
Fig. 9: below 13 km there is an advantage in using slice
reconciliation, but over this distance binary encodings
lead and allow to distill secret key over large distances
[7].
We used the experimental system reported in [8] and
operated it in the high SNR regime for very low losses
between Alice and Bob. For a SNR of 19 and a line
transmission of 0.995, we obtained an excess noise of 0.03
shot noise units (SNU) on Bob’s side, i.e. an excess noise
of 0.05 SNU on Alice’s side for a measured homodyne
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Figure 9: (Color online). Secret key rate in the RR scenario.
From top to bottom the curves show the secret key rate with:
ideal measurement devices, realistic devices characterized by
a finite detection efficiency η and an electronic noise velec,
slice reconciliation and reconciliation over a BIAWGN. The
thick lines show secret key rate, the thin lines the optimal
SNR which is a function of the input signal variance. The
secret key rate of the first twenty km is zoomed in at the
upper right corner. Parameters: ξ = 0.0015VA, α = 0.2, η =
0.6, velec = 0.01.
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Figure 10: (Color online). Secret key rate in the DR scenario.
From top to bottom the curves show the secret key rate with:
ideal measurement devices, realistic devices characterized by
a finite detection efficiency η and an electronic noise velec, slice
reconciliation and reconciliation over a BIAWGN. The thick
lines show secret key rate, the thin lines the optimal SNR
which is a function of the input signal variance. Parameters:
ξ = 0.0015VA, α = 0.2, η = 0.6, velec = 0.01.
detection efficiency of 0.6 and an electronic noise of 0.01
SNU. We obtained a practical reconciliation efficiency of
95% and the secret key rate per pulse is about 1.02 in
the reverse reconciliation scenario while it reaches 1.04 in
the direct reconciliation scenario. These measurements
confirm the possibility to extract more than one secret
bit per pulse with a CVQKD system.
We investigated the robustness of these results in the
composable security framework presented in [25]. In the
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Figure 11: (Color online) Secret key rate in the RR scenario
with a heterodyne detection and the security proof of [25].
From top to bottom the curves show the secret key rate in
the asymptotic and finite key scenario for realistic devices
characterized by an electronic noise velec = 0.001 and a finite
detection efficiency η = 0.85 and η = 0.6. We consider here
the paranoid mode where the noise added by the detection
can be manipulated by the attacker. The solid lines show
the asymptotic secret key rate, the dashed lines show the
secret key rate with finite blocks of length n = 109. Other
parameters: ξ = 0.0015VA, α = 0.2, blocks size n = 109 and
the security parameter  = 10−10.
same way than our previous simulations, we optimized
the secret key rate with respect to the reconciliation ef-
ficiency and considered both direct and reverse recon-
ciliation scenarios with imperfect devices. However, we
considered the heterodyne protocol, as described in [25],
in the paranoid mode where the imperfections of the de-
tector are assumed to be controlled by Eve and in the
limit of finite-length data blocks. This corresponds to
the most secure known scenario and as expected the se-
cret key rate is lower than in our previous simulations as
shown in Fig. 11. With a heterodyne detection charac-
terized by an efficiency η = 0.6 and an electronic noise
velec = 0.01, the secret key rate vanishes at about 30 km.
This is why we plot in Fig. 11 the secret key rate in both
the finite key and the asymptotic scenario for realistic im-
provements of the heterodyne detection. All the curves
are plotted with an electronic noise velec = 0.001 which
is achievable with cooled heterodyne detections. With a
heterodyne detection efficiency of 60% a secure distance
of about 35 km can be achieved in the finite key scenario
while an improved heterodyne detection efficiency of 85%
would allow us to exchange keys at about 80 km but in
the asymptotic limit. One can see that the secret key
rate drops below 1 bit per symbol with a heterodyne de-
tection efficiency of 60%. We show in Fig. 12 that it is
still possible to exchange secret keys with a rate higher
than 1 bit per symbol at short distance (0.1 km) even
in the paranoid mode and using finite data blocks but
at the expense of improving the detection efficiency to
about 91% and using data blocks of size 1010.
In Table II we compare a recent DVQKD experiment
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Figure 12: (Color online) Secret key rate in the RR scenario
with a heterodyne detection and the security proof of [25].
From top to bottom the curves show the secret key rate in the
asymptotic and finite key scenario for realistic devices char-
acterized by an electronic noise velec = 0.001 with respect to
the detection efficiency. We consider here the paranoid mode
where the noise added by the detection can be manipulated
by the attacker. Other parameters: distance d = 0.1km,
ξ = 0.0015VA, α = 0.2, blocks size n = 1010 and the security
parameter  = 10−10.
yielding high secret key throughput [26] with the two
CVQKD scenarios depicted in Fig. 11. Columns two
and four correspond to secret key rate per signal, while
columns seven to nine correspond to secret key through-
puts. Columns three and five respectively give the ratios
between columns two and six and between columns four
and six. In order to get a throughput figure, we multi-
ply the secret key rates by the corresponding clock rate.
Column seven corresponds to a clock rate of 1 MHz as
reported in [8], while column eight reports the expected
throughput for a reasonable improvement of the clock
rate to 50 MHz.
On the hardware side, increasing the clock rate to
about 50 MHz is not a big deal: high bandwidth op-
tical modulators and acquisition cards are commercially
available while homodyne detections running at a few
hundreds MHz have already been reported [27]. As re-
gards the post-processing, privacy amplification can be
done at a few hundreds of MHz on one core of a modern
CPU but high efficiency error correction as described in
this paper would require at least one modern GPU and
probably two. More generally, when dealing with contin-
uous values at such speeds, every step, such as random
numbers generation and network communication, must
be implemented carefully.
V. CONCLUSION
We have optimized the performance of practical recon-
ciliation schemes for CVQKD, and the resulting schemes
have above 90% efficiency for any SNR, which leads to
higher key rates than those reported in past CVQKD ex-
periments [8]. Notably, for distances below 100m, more
8rate throughput
CVQKD1 ratio1/3 CVQKD2 ratio2/3 DVQKD3 1 MHz1 50 MHz2 1 GHz3
100 m 2.7E-01 17 6.0E-01 39 1.5E-02 2.7E+05 3.0E+07 1.5E+07
10 km 1.1E-01 12 2.2E-01 23 9.5E-03 1.1E+05 1.1E+07 9.5E+06
30 km 9.0E-03 2 3.2E-02 9 3.6E-03 9.0E+03 1.6E+07 3.6E+06
40 km - - 3.7E-03 2 2.2E-03 - 1.8E+05 2.2E+06
Table II: Comparison of CVQKD and DVQKD. 1 corresponds to a realistic setting characterized by an electronic noise velec =
0.001, a detection efficiency η = 0.6 and a 1MHz repetition rate [8]. 2 corresponds to an optimistic setting characterized by an
electronic noise velec = 0.001, a detection efficiency η = 0.85 and a 50MHz repetition rate. 3 corresponds to the DVQKD data
reported in [26]. For CVQKD, the figures are obtained using the security proof of Ref. [25] as in Fig. 11.
than 1 bit per symbol can be distilled. The expected
throughput with a CVQKD clock rate of 1 MHz, as re-
ported in [8], is lower than the best DVQKD reported
throughput, which uses a 1 GHz clock rate [26]. However,
we predict (see Table II) that reasonable improvements
of the CVQKD hardware would result in throughputs
higher than those of DVQKD in distances up to 30 Km.
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